Shouldn’t We Simply Avoid Cruelty?
Why are anti-cruelty laws theoretically impotent?
As Tom Regan argues, the term cruelty appeals to a certain state of mind: X’s vivisection of Y is prohibited if the impetus for X’s action was a desire to see Y in a state of persistent pain. If an act is prohibited by an anti-cruelty law, a certain “bad” intention must have motivated the prohibited action. It follows that a society’s designation that using my family dog as a dart-board is an unlawful act, for example, is not derived from a duty owed directly to the dog, but the result of an outpouring of benevolence: “We as society shall take pity on you Jake-the-dog; our kindness has compelled us to choose not to throw sharp metallic objects into your body.”
This is clearly flawed as those who consciously exploit animals are in fact often not cruel. Those who consume animals or wear leather are not cruel. They are products, effects, of our culture. Granted, many hunters, scientists, etc. are callous people, however, many of them are not. Again, they are the results of societal processes that condition all of us to believe that animals are our resources. They are wrong, their actions are immoral, but they are not cruel.
Within the animal rights movement the concept of “rights” (although I am not bound to such a term) is employed because, as with members of our own species, certain actions are prohibited as a matter of justice.
As the dominant group men haven’t chosen not to rape women out of kindness or because it’s cruel to forcefully take sex from women, but because women ought to be respected as possessors of a kind of value that demands that their interests be protected.
We ought to extend the principle of “equal protection of interests” to all persons capable of caring that you are respecting their interests because that is what justice demands of us. Kindness is not the impetus, benevolence doesn’t compel the movement; the logic of our own moral intuitions and basic assumptions about the wrongness of both unnecessary suffering and failing to respect the “inherent value,” in Regan’s conception of “rights,” of all those who posses it ought to move our hearts and minds.
Of course we should be kind in our dealings with other sensitive beings. However, as a question of ethics, kindness, however this is conceived, is but a sufficient manifestation of an acknowledgment that suffering is intrinsically evil, an acknowledgment that necessarily informs the defining of ethical constraints on action.
The practical impotence of anti-cruelty laws has been expounded forcefully by Francione (see the property status of nonhumans), and are not in need of repeating here.
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Crossposted @ That Vegan Girl
If I may mildy disagree on some points –
My take is that when society enacts anti-cruelty laws to dogs, they both realize and articulate that certain things done to those dogs are not merely unkind but are just plain wrong. More generally, I don’t hold that cruelty and ethical wrongness are as separate as you make them out to be.
Granted, some of this is semantics, but cruelty to me generally implies an act of moral wrongness. The basic morals from which we derive codes of conduct, laws, and rights have a strong anti-cruelty component: the golden rule is basically a prohibitoon against cruelty and an implicit obligation to show kindness and mercy.
While omnivores may not be cruel, that is not the issue; the issue is that the things they do - usually indirrectly, through their willinging participation - are cruel. Legal protections are made to prevent and punish cruel acts; they are not a judgment on the offender’s character (although punishments may take that into acount).
Taken to their logical endpoints, kindness, compassion, and abstinence from cruelty take us farther than rights, toward the truly peaceful, just, and harmonious world we all want. Rights are a necessary hedge to protect would-be victims from a lack of those qualities.
~ Recent blog post: Dairy and Disease at http://www.animalwritings.com ~
Further thoughts…
I believe you are making this distinction, which is valid: It is wrong to kill the chicken even if the killer merely thinks that this what you do with chickens and has no conscious ill will toward the chicken.
However…
- I’m never convinced that one can do things to sentient beings that are so clearly against the victim’s will, and be completely unaware of that fundamental fact. True, we can harden our hearts, engage in denial, and rationalize, but thoe are merely defense mechanisms to protect ourselves from admiting the cruel and wrong nature of what we’re doing, and I’m not convinced that they are ever 100 percent efective.
Unless the wrongdoer is organically unable to comprehend right and wrong, or others’ interests (which would absolve the offender of moral responsibility), at some level, the offender knows that what s/he is doing is not right, that it is morally problematic. This internal disconnect between morals and actions will manifest itself somehow - bad dreams, ill temper, inability to sleep, tendency to get sick, need to believe in self-serving fantasies (e.g., “they’re here for our use”), etc. I don’t believe denial and rationalization ever totally work.
- What is it that makes us realize that killing the chicken is wrong? Not just logic. Logic is amoral. We start with basic recognitions of others’ interests; we have a sense of - at the very least - crude right and wrong. This may be part of our makeup, and derive from an inborn affinity toward other sentient individuals. (I hold that we ultimately devine these truths from a spiritual realm, but that is beside the point for now.) From this basic sense, or a priori knowledge, that violating others’ interests is wrong, we craft rights and laws (at least in theory) and develop moral codes to prevent cruelty and obligate us to be kind and respectful. All these motivations, prohibitions, and moral frameworks are deeply intertwined, and IMHO we should consider all these facets in our outreach.
- Intent does matter. Our laws and morals recognize that is more wrong to kill a victim intentionally than out of negligence or as the result of being brainwashed. In some cases, intent significantly drives a law, e.g., hate crime legislation.
~ Recent blog post: Dairy and Disease at http://www.animalwritings.com ~
Quote:
“I’m never convinced that one can do things to sentient beings that are so clearly against the victim’s will, and be completely unaware of that fundamental fact. True, we can harden our hearts, engage in denial, and rationalize, but those are merely defense mechanisms to protect ourselves from admitting the cruel and wrong nature of what we’re doing, and I’m not convinced that they are ever 100 percent effective.”
I tend to agree; however, I think you are mistaken to assume that “denial and rationalization” don’t “ever totally work.” As I follow the debates about felonious actions, for example, and our companion animals, I do think that cruelty and “wrongness” are collapsed. There is a distinct acknowledgement throughout these discussions that “they are, after all, just dogs.” Therefore, questions of justice – what these dogs are owed or due – while they may be implied do not compel an alteration to the laws. As I think about it, there is another premise implied in these debates: Appealing to a Kantian understanding of human nature, torturing a cat, for example, is said to directly harm the person doing the torture thereby making the human “hardened” to other humans. It follows from this, I believe, that the animals’ interests are not the impetus for the laws but secondary concerns.
Quote:
“Unless the wrongdoer is organically unable to comprehend right and wrong, or others’ interests (which would absolve the offender of moral responsibility), at some level, the offender knows that what s/he is doing is not right, that it is morally problematic.”
It seems to me that you are relying too much on assumptions about fundamentals that are said to compose us as human beings. I really think this is mistaken. John Stuart Mill said what is believed to be “natural” is most often cultural; what is “normal,” merely common. We are products, I believe, of acculturation. If I intentionally harm another creature, and my identity has been defined through processes of lived experiences, I, in fact, may not “know” that what I am doing is wrong. If I choose to do otherwise - not harm the creature - it is done out of kindness, which, given our discourses about justice, is distinct from what is “right.” I agree that the distinction between “justice” and “cruelty” may not be as wide as I first suggested; however, given the nature of our prejudice against nonhumans, this is a moot point I think.
Such are the barriers that those concerned with ethics beyond species must overcome. I think, therefore, that while I disagree with the premise on which anti-cruelty laws are built, it seems reasonable to argue that such laws are necessary first steps toward a recognition of justice.
However, be that as it may, it is important to note the distinction, lest we confuse our position. Your point, “Taken to their logical endpoints, kindness, compassion, and abstinence from cruelty take us farther than rights, toward the truly peaceful, just, and harmonious world we all want” is accurate I think. However, we are working within a context of rights-based justice; therefore, when I argue against such premises (e.g., kindness) as deriving our concern for nonhumans, it’s pragmatic.
Quote:
“What is it that makes us realize that killing the chicken is wrong? Not just logic. Logic is amoral. We start with basic recognitions of others’ interests; we have a sense of - at the very least - crude right and wrong.”
This is an interesting point. I don’t agree, however, that my concern, for example, for the interests of nonhuman animals is “we have a sense of - at the very least - crude right and wrong.” I think it is logic: it’s the logic of our commonly held premises concerning suffering and happiness. Why we have come to believe that pain, for example, is intrinsically evil, I don’t know. I would guess that it was a practical effect of our shared sentience. But extending this concern beyond our own specific groups was indeed, I think, logic that compelled the move. There seems to be an internal logic to these discourses. Roughly, they’re defined as “basic human rights,” of course, however, there’s a rolling development whereby the moral community is gradually widened to include the most obvious excluded group, then the next most obvious excluded group, and so on.
Plato said, when concerning humans and ethics, we cannot teach but remind. I tend to agree. This is the method I adopt: I rely on emotion to capture their attention; I then open up a dialogue about why the images they are witnessing are “bad,” which leads into a discussion about certain premises we share and thus questions of justice.
Thanks for the conversation Gary. You illuminate several interesting points.
~ Recent blog post: The lesson here is don’t attack Mormons in Orem. at http://www.not-quiteright.net/tvg ~
Hi Alex,
Thanks very much for your cogent and thoughtful points - both in your original post and in your response to my comments (and in other venues). In the interest of mutually respectful and possibly illuminating dialog, let me offer some more thoughts. Caveat: These are not at all intended to be “You’re wrong, I’m right” responses. These issues are complicated and multi-faceted - to me, anyway! - and I’m always learning, and learning from others, as I go along.
I believe that when someone who harms others against their will, or who is in an unearned position of privilege and exploits others, says of his/her victims, “they are just …,” that in itself is a defense mechanism - which in turn indicates an awareness of guilt and wrongdoing, however cleverly and thickly masked, and regardless of how habituated the person is to the wrongful actions. It is using language - a mantra, practically - to devalue the victims. It’s a superficial technique, but when repeated often enough, lies can masquerade as truth.
I contend, however, that any five-year old knows that, compared to an inanimate object, a dog is not “just a.” The differences are profound. We recognize sentience and react to it. No amount of rationalization or institutions that normalize cruelty can completely suppress that.
As you point out, over time we absorb the mores and morals of the culture within which we develop and live. But this acculturation is merely the product of many individuals trying to institutionalize and normalize their knowlingly wrongful attitudes and moral transgressions; using society and manipulating “authority” to permit your wrongful or unkind acts are forms of defense mechanisms. When enough people are engaged in the wrongful actions and have the same selfish motives, it’s that much easier to codify wrongness and make it seem normal. In this way, cruelty / wrongdoing - whatever we want to call it - is more easily passed on to others. This helps mask everyone’s guilt, by producing structures and customs that give the impression that all this cruelty and wrongness is acceptable and normal.
But I remain quite firm in my belief that it never truly erases one’s guilt or deep knowledge of wrongdoing. Discuss the subject long enough - or sometimes only for two minutes - and the offender’s guilt shows up - sometimes blatantly. For instance, nearly every participant in institutionalized animal cruelty and/or exploitation will state, sort of as a pro forma indemnity clause, something like “of course, we should not be gratuitously cruel to animals.” This statement is uttered in part because the offender already is doubtful about his/her rightness, and feels the need to assure the vegan (the “judge”) that s/he is an ok person, and acknowledges that mistreatment of animals is a moral wrong.
And yet, nearly everyone who says that willfully engages in cruelties that they admit are wrong - if not immediately then once you start explaining what goes on in factory farms, vivisection labs, etc.
So we have masses of people who, a couple or so layers down, know that their actions are wrong and do it anyway. (I think of the polls that show 90 percent of the population opposed to battery cages, even though most of those respondents purchase eggs from battery caged hens, either knowingly or out of moral laziness.)
Those internal conflicts can never be completely quieted. They get you somehow. It’s sort of like instant karma. The mind as well as the body seeks homeostasis and you cannot achieve that if you are doing things that violate your deepest moral sense, and - even worse - if you are engaging in denial about your transgressions. The mind (and the body, since the two are connect), will react one way or another.
The solution to this inner turmoil, of course, is to stop participating in the cruelty/wrongness and practice compassion. But for any number of reasons - including following the norms and paths of least resistance in one’s social groups - people engage in all manner of energy-sapping, destructive, morally weak denial and rationalizations. Such a shameful waste.
On logic…We certainly can describe our morals in terms of logic, and logic is an inidspensable tool for explaining and discussing morals (and writing laws), yet I maintain that it takes no logic to see that hurting others is wrong. To paraphrase Peter Singer (not that I always agree with him), our logic helps codify things that we feel.
Once again, I want to emphasize that my comments are made with the highest respect. How wonderful that here we are putting our heads together trying to figure out the best ways to help animals and the oppressed everywhere. Constructive criticism always welcomed.
Peace to all,
Gary
~ Recent blog post: Dairy May Cause Rather Than Prevent Osteoporosis at http://www.animalwritings.com ~
I always think of something I should have said in my last comment… Just to clarify - I strongly agree that acculturation is a highly significant factor in shaping and reinforcing one’s attitudes and behaviors toward animals. But just as culture influences our individuals natures, so do our individual natures influence culture, forming some sort of bilateral feedback loop which is resistant to change. Unfortunately, right now, in many instances this loop is rewarding and promoting our worser natures and stifling our better natures. So, to me, it makes sense to change both our individual attitudes and behaviors as well as societal institutions such laws and business policies.
~ Recent blog post: Dairy May Cause Rather Than Prevent Osteoporosis at http://www.animalwritings.com ~
Gary wrote:
“On logic…We certainly can describe our morals in terms of logic, and logic is an inidspensable tool for explaining and discussing morals (and writing laws), yet I maintain that it takes no logic to see that hurting others is wrong. To paraphrase Peter Singer (not that I always agree with him), our logic helps codify things that we feel.”
I both agree and disagree. I think logic is a powerful tool that does indeed “codify things that we feel.” I also agree with Alex when he wrote:
“that my concern, for example, for the interests of nonhuman animals is ‘we have a sense of - at the very least - crude right and wrong.’ I think it is logic: it’s the logic of our commonly held premises concerning suffering and happiness. Why we have come to believe that pain, for example, is intrinsically evil, I don’t know. I would guess that it was a practical effect of our shared sentience. But extending this concern beyond our own specific groups was indeed, I think, logic that compelled the move. There seems to be an internal logic to these discourses. Roughly, they’re defined as ‘basic human rights,’ of course, however, there’s a rolling development whereby the moral community is gradually widened to include the most obvious excluded group, then the next most obvious excluded group, and so on.”
For example, while I agree with Gary that humans tend to know a priori that it’s wrong to harm animals and that this is evidenced in child behavior, logic/ reason is needed to take that intuition to the next level and become vegan.
For example, the expression:
‘Give a three-year-old an apple and a rabbit. If the child eats the rabbit and plays with the apple, you’ve got a carnivore.’
It’s true. No well-socialized child without serious medical or psychological disability would eat the rabbit. Most children would snuggle with the rabbit and eat or try to eat the apple. Most children love animals and want to cause them no harm.
But in cases of children raised without human influence (neglected children, children “raised by wolves”, isolated children, etc. similar child abuse resulting in “feral children”) they don’t seem to have this same set of beliefs that animals should be respected and not harmed. Quote:
“Children brought up by animals usually adopt the diet of their foster family, and that usually means raw meat. This results in a dislike of any other foodstuff, including cooked meat and any form of vegetable matter. In fact, they develop a real craving for raw meat, and several are recorded as having an overpowering desire for fresh blood.”
Source: http://www.feralchildren.com/en/diet.php
Indeed, neglecting, abandoning, or isolating children is considered child abuse because of this result of the child’s cessation of moral and cognitive development. But these sad cases tell us about our species: we are not capable of rights-based ethics unless both emotion and reason are developed and engaged.
There is no one, true “human nature.” It does take logic (or some form of cognitive reasoning) to see that harming others is wrong.
Those of us who have been fortunate enough to have been exposed to kindness towards animals as well as logical reasoning can develop these sets of moral and legal codes involving our relationships with nonhuman animals. Those who haven’t been exposed, need exposure.
I think Gary is right on that “it makes sense to change both our individual attitudes and behaviors as well as societal institutions such laws and business policies.” I agree that there is a loop influence wherein humans act both as groups and as individuals, affecting the development of each other.
I think Alex is right on that “Of course we should be kind in our dealings with other sensitive beings. However, as a question of ethics, kindness, however this is conceived, is but a sufficient manifestation of an acknowledgment that suffering is intrinsically evil, an acknowledgment that necessarily informs the defining of ethical constraints on action.”
The pro-animal movement needs both empathy and logic in order to change the world.
Interestingly, regarding feral children:
“Children who fend for themselves in the wild have usually had the ingenuity to develop some means of sustenance. Generally speaking, those who survive on their own wits are forced to adopt a vegetarian diet of roots, fruits, grass and leaves”
Thanks again Gary. And, please, I fully recognize that your comments are meant to be constructive, and I see them as such. The discourse is both productive and appreciated.
Indeed, this statement,
“I believe that when someone who harms others against their will, or who is in an unearned position of privilege and exploits others, says of his/her victims, “they are just …,” that in itself is a defense mechanism - which in turn indicates an awareness of guilt and wrongdoing, however cleverly and thickly masked, and regardless of how habituated the person is to the wrongful actions. It is using language - a mantra, practically - to devalue the victims. It’s a superficial technique, but when repeated often enough, lies can masquerade as truth.”
is exciting for me because I have never heard it articulated like that. I’ve recently discussed this line of reasoning with fellow “animal rights” activists and I have concluded that you may be correct. I can say with some certainty, however, that I overstated my initial argument.
You comments seem be suggesting that we commonly share a principle that “harm” or “suffering” is bad – ethically and prudentially speaking: “Pain ought to be avoided” is a premise we hold collectively. A premise, indeed, that to a significant extent governs our behavior (or at least we believe it ought to place limits on our interactions with other individuals).
Now, my argument previously, was meant to suggest that we do, in fact, strongly hold this premise; however, we also hold another premise, just as strongly, that the suffering of nonhumans is not of significant (or any?) moral concern for x, y, and z reasons. Your counter – “it just is” being a rationalization that effectively implies a conscious understanding of the wrongness of harming any sentient beings – is correct, I believe, up to a point. Meaning, I believe that you are right to argue that we hold this principle (“Harm is bad”) very strongly, and that when we begin to make distinctions between who is harmed, and whether X’s harm matters but Y’s doesn’t, we are implying an acknowledgement that the principle we hold against causing harm necessarily applies to all beings – human and nonhuman – who suffer; therefore, we feel obliged to justify what we consciously know demands a defense. Hence, “It’s natural,” or “They’re just.” This means that my argument – that we hold another premise distinguishing between human suffering and nonhuman suffering as strongly as we do the “harm principle” – is incorrect because, as you said, the rationalizations are merely secondary to the primary principle against suffering.
Now I say “up to a point” because I think you forget to acknowledge the strongly held premise justifying the distinction between humans and nonhumans; which, I think, accounts for your disagreement with my position that in our society we, in fact, do not “know” it is wrong to suffer harm on some nonhumans for arbitrary reasons. I think, therefore, that your argument “But I remain quite firm in my belief that it never truly erases one’s guilt or deep knowledge of wrongdoing” is not correct.
Enter logic: We hold these premises (i.e., nonhuman-human split, and “non-harm”), one stronger than the other, and it is logic that bridges the gap between reason and desire. Indeed, due to our enculturation, our desire is able to counter the “harm principle,” which I believe forms much of the basis of our ethical reasoning, thereby elevating the weaker held premise (nonhuman-human distinction) above the stronger held premise (suffering is bad). I, therefore, disagree that there exists an “inner turmoil” in most people because the logic of our strongly held premise against suffering has yet to be unfolded. Until that point, as they say, one is not awakened to the wrongness of their actions – as judged by their own premises.
Eccentric Vegan wrote, “The pro-animal movement needs both empathy and logic in order to change the world.” I agree. As Hume argued, empathy provides the impetus to demand the appropriate actions that accord with our reasoned beliefs. Empathy is the impetus for action in some cases; however, this impetus is predicated upon premises we strongly hold, which are unfolded through logic. As Eccentric Vegan said, “There is no one, true “human nature.” It does take logic (or some form of cognitive reasoning) to see that harming others is wrong.”
Because we have defined ethical constraints based on non-harm it is a premise we hold. Its logic that forces us to re-define the boundaries in which this premise against certain actions plays itself out. As Singer says, extending the moral community is the unfolding of our own premises, effectively countering the weaker held premises.
Thanks again both of you for this conversation.
~ Recent blog post: The lesson here is don’t attack Mormons in Orem. at http://www.not-quiteright.net/tvg ~