Self-evident Animal Rights?
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Lynn Hunt responds to the apparent inconsistency of the claim that human rights are “self evident” (see the Declaration of Independence), while necessarily having to write them into a document articulating what form these rights take. Hunt argues,
“The process had and has a kind of circularity to it: you know the meaning of human rights because you feel distressed when they are violated. The truths of human rights might be paradoxical in this sense, but they are nonetheless still self-evident.”
Hunt’s insight, I believe, can be applied to animal rights as well: we know the meaning of animal rights because we feel distressed when we see a “downer” cow being dragged to slaughter behind a forklift, for example; when a dog is being forced into combat with another dog we know that both of the animals’ rights are being violated. Our “inner sense of outrage” demands the proper response when a hen is sexually assaulted by a slaughterhouse employee. If a horse is starved by her human our moral intuitions say “This is wrong!”
However, the object(s) of our moral outrage is limited by our collective irrational biases, and prejudices against certain species’ of animals, which seems to suggest that the truths of animal rights are not truths at all in the moral sense: animal rights are not universal but culturally relative, subjective constructions. I mean, we all continue to gleefully eat the bodies of billions of animals annually, while Michael Vick spends time in prison for his actions.
The logic of this response, however, can and must also be applied to the context of human rights. I live in Washington D.C., a city populated by thousands upon thousands of homeless men, women, and children, who suffer from malnutrition, the elements, psychological trauma, etc. And yet, this continues. Everyday we walk past these individuals, preferring to spend our money on alcohol at one of the local bars instead of spending those dollars on a meal for some pitiful looking homeless women. Rape is used as a weapon of war throughout our world today, but we prefer to bicker about which consenting adults ought to have the opportunity to marry (the right of marriage, of course, is also considered a human right). Infant Chinese girls are considered replaceable, less in value than their male counterparts, but this does not prevent us from enacting policy favoring trade with China. Genocide in Darfur continues. Our government sanctions torture, a form of punishment and interrogation explicitly condemned as immoral in the Declaration of Independence’s articulation of those inalienable, universal human rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
Does this suggest that the truths of human rights are in fact not self-evident, but a prudent creation – a fiction? I only have the “right to life” if my government says so. If not then I don’t and you don’t either. “Liberty” is like health care, it’s a privilege. Was Jeremy Bentham correct when he argued that talk of moral or inalienable rights is “nonsense upon stilts.”
Is this correct? I think, or rather I know, the answer to this question is no. And so do you. Where do they come from? Perhaps reason, nature or god, our shared sentience; I don’t know, but they’re real.
For selfish reason T, U, and V, and for other reasons W, X, Y, and Z we fail to demand action in response to our inner outrage over various moral wrongs; however, we experience that inner outrage nonetheless. This holds true for both human rights and animal rights.
Crossposted @ That Vegan Girl
By definition, doesn’t a “self-evident right” have to be recognized as a right by the individual wishing to exercise it? Violation of individual rights does not result in them being any less self-evident or real. The concept of a self-evident right requires one to rise up and seize said right, not sit around waiting for handouts. In fact, that is EXACTLY what the Declaration of Independence was about: recognition of a violation of rights and the subsequent seizure and exercise of those rights. Feeling pain at the result of inhumane treatment does not constitute recognition of rights and neither does others being horrified at such treatment. A self-evident, natural right is recognized and exercised by the individual, not the collective. Using a self-evident argument would seem counter-productive to the advancement of an animal rights regime.
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The mere fact that humans must use fences and cages to contain animals suggests animals have wills of their own and that those wills do not include being confined let alone being tortured or killed.
Fear response does not constitute recognition of rights…neither does possessing a will. No one argued that they weren’t scared or cognizant of what was happening. That doesn’t make any rights they might have self-evident. Re-read.
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“By definition, doesn’t a “self-evident right” have to be recognized as a right by the individual wishing to exercise it?”
No, not by definition at all.
This doesn’t follow logically or ethically, John. A moral right is universally applicable to all persons acknowledged to be a member of the moral community and who can reasonably realize the right: If my claim that I have a moral “right to life,” for example, is valid then all persons like me in the morally relevant ways also possess this valid moral claim.
Acknowledgement as a possessor of the right is absolutely not necessary. By this logic, those individuals incapable of acknowledging their rights would in fact not possess those rights. The severely mentally handicapped, for example, would not have a “right to life” because by your erroneous definition they are incapable of realizing their right in the following way: “The concept of a self-evident right requires one to rise up and seize said right, not sit around waiting for handouts.” Children would also not be in a position to make such a moral claim.
I think that you will now argue that those capable of defending their rights can act paternalistically on behalf of those incapable of doing so; therefore, secondary, or defense by-proxy, is sufficient. However, this ought to be extended to animals as they are in precisely the same position as a child or a mentally retarded person.
John, your argument is merely a restatement of the principle of “might makes right.” A moral principal that has been sufficiently proven deficient since it was employed to subjugate women to the status of children, and black human beings to the status of property.
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“A self-evident, natural right is recognized and exercised by the individual, not the collective.”
This doesn’t make any sense logically or in light of your previous statement,” In fact, that is EXACTLY what the Declaration of Independence was about: recognition of a violation of rights and the subsequent seizure and exercise of those rights.” The Revolutions in our country and France were both collective movements, not individual achievements. However, I don’t know what this has to do with anything relevant to the issue at hand.
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“Feeling pain at the result of inhumane treatment does not constitute recognition of rights.
Fear response does not constitute recognition of rights…neither does possessing a will.”
Who argued this, John?
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“neither does others being horrified at such treatment.”
Why not? That is the argument that Lynn Hunt proffers regarding human rights, an argument that I extended to animal rights. Where are we wrong?
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“By definition, doesn’t a “self-evident right” have to be recognized as a right by the individual wishing to exercise it?”
No, not by definition at all.
A “self-evident right”, is an axiom, a postulate, a prejudice.
To be self-evident it must appear to be obvious to the perceiver and to not require or be amenable to reasoning or evidence.
e.g.: “reality exists”… is self-evident.
A “right” is either a statement of permission, a rule, based on an axiom that a thing called “morality” exists, and that that thing comprises potentially axiomatic concepts of “good” and “evil/bad”, that is conferred via a collective (sanctioned as “good”); or, it is a direct moral axiom of the intrinsic goodness (or badness) of a thing; (both pending a definition of “good”).
A “self-evident right” is an assumed permission granted by a collective of which a person submits to; or, it is an assumed “goodness”; (both pending a definition of “good”).
So, before you waste any further time, you need to pin the tail on the donkey as to what you mean by “good”.
For many “good” is determined by their ideo-religio-political prosriptions; for some it’s more philosophical: relativist v objectivist; individualist v collectivist.
For the user of this site the “Vegan Soapbox Discussion Policy” holds sway, and rights are temporarily conferred by it.
For most living systems what is “good for them” is to live; and if that means killing to life, that is “good”; because living is “good”.
If you empathise with the suffering of a chicken, a bacteria, or a tomarto, does that make you more “good”? To the chicken, the bacteria, and tomarto… possibly; to your fellow humans – possibly only if there is a perceived relevance or benefit to mankind.
Whether you claim a “moral right to life” or not, it does not necessarily follow that all others share that, without resorting to “the self-evident supernatural”.
You can assert all the rights you like alone in the desert, but without another to agree with you, they are not rights at all – they are dependent on being part of a group (even just of two members). If alone, the assertion of a right is irrelevant and meaningless (unless you resort to the supernatural, which is a way of creating a group, albeit possibly an imaginary one), because there is no-one to attest to your assertion of your right.
Nor does a prevailing emotion necessarily signify a right, unless you assert that it is self-evident that an emotion is a signal for morality without recourse to reason or evidence.
Possession of a will is “self-evident” (in that we can’t prove a negative, and it looks like “will”-like behaviour). Possession of a will in a species does not mean it logical follows that another species should confer rights; or that rights are innate either… it’s anthropomorphisation.
When people say “I have the right to…”, I wonder if they themselves even understand what they mean.
“I have given myself permission to…”, is that it?
or
“It is good if I can…”, and what does “good” mean (to you)?
“It triggers a release of seratonin when I can…”
(makes you feel happy inside, because you’ve avoided cognitive dissonance?).
I can’t see any other meaningful definition beyond:
“I will survive, now that I know I am alive!”
Hence I care not for the fluffy kitten any more that the slimy cockroach… if they threaten my survival, I’ll destroy them; If I need to eat them to live; I’ll kill ‘em and eat ‘em.
Being a Vegan, is basically maladaptive, and if if it’s maladaptive, it’s the closest thing to a (mildly) immoral idea there is… unless of course eating animals was driving my species into extinction, in which case, the whole paradigm changes, and it becomes adaptive, and thence moral.
Might always makes right:
If you assert a right (a rule) that “might doesn’t make right”, it doesn’t logically follow that I have to acknowledge it: I can ignore it and you can either prove me right by allowing me enforce “might makes right”, or prove me right by (assuming we are of (subgroups of) the same group) enlisting the support of the group to enforce the right that “might does not make right”, in which case, might is making right; therefore might makes right: QED.
so spake the prophet Rinky.
Amen.
Rinky wrote,
We can agree that the majority of humans aren’t philosophers and haven’t understood/used the word ‘rights’ the way philosophers understand/mean by them. That doesn’t matter.
They use words, including the word “rights”, the way dogs bark or cows moo. It’s a vocalization of an interest. They may as well say, “I want” or “I need.” Does it matter that they’ve chosen the word “rights”? You can infer their meaning. You can choose to respect their wishes or not.
Rinky continued,
In your own use of the word “right” you’ve demonstrated a misunderstanding of the word.
You’re correct; you can choose to ignore someone else’s interests. You can respect someone or you can impose your will upon them. That doesn’t make their needs or wants disappear. It doesn’t conflate your power to destroy with their desire to live. They are separate.
Can =/= should.
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“If you empathise with the suffering of a chicken, a bacteria, or a tomarto, does that make you more “good”? To the chicken, the bacteria, and tomarto… possibly; to your fellow humans – possibly only if there is a perceived relevance or benefit to mankind.”
Rinky,
As a factual correction, on the same grounds that I can assume your sentience, it follows from the principle of parsimony that neither the tomato nor the bacteria suffer. So that’s corrected.
To the philosophy. It is always curious to me when people conflate “survival of the species” with “morality,” while failing to answer the question that is begged from the outset: What about in-group exploitation? It follows strongly from your statement — “For most living systems what is “good for them” is to live; and if that means killing to life, that is “good”; because living is “good”. — that in-group exploitation for this end is a logical conclusion. However, this conclusion is clearly contradicted by common ethical practices within our society — i.e., we do not exploit the severely handicapped for medical purposes even though this exploitation would certainly produce evidence of significant benefit to the “species.”
The quoted statement is also fallacious given that it assumes a collective-whole-guiding- morality as opposed to the individuals-who-comprise-the-whole-guided-morality. It seems to me that the former doesn’t capture how reasoning actually occurs: individuals reason, whole species do not. This leads to the next fallacy. Assuming that some characteristic about a collective — “the living system” — yields moral conclusions is also fallacious given that one cannot, logically, deduce from a statement of fact about a thing, an “ought” statement.
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“Whether you claim a “moral right to life” or not, it does not necessarily follow that all others share that, without resorting to “the self-evident supernatural”.”
You are missing Ms. Hunts point. She concedes your argument, as do I. However, this is a separate issue from intuitive conclusions that we generally accept as derived from certain principles we collectively hold — about suffering, for example.
This moves into my challenge, or more accurately, my correction of your misunderstanding of my post. I don’t think Hunt would argue that the premise — i.e., “Self-evident human rights”– logically leads to the conclusion that “morality exists” as an existential claim. The point is far simpler than that. We hold certain principles as fundamental; from these principles we deduce premises that lead to ethical conclusions. Witnessing suffering and being offended by it is one example of a principle that rejects suffering as impartially bad engendering a premise: suffering offends me. Accordingly, even if we don’t acknowledge certain ethical conclusions, we recognize that an evil — a human rights offense — is occurring when we see it. Likewise with animal rights goes my argument: a basic right to be free from unnecessary pain, for example.
You are correct to argue that these are “axioms” we hold. However, it doesn’t follow that from this we must conclude that “morality” existentially exists. We are speaking about practical ethics.
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“Nor does a prevailing emotion necessarily signify a right, unless you assert that it is self-evident that an emotion is a signal for morality without recourse to reason or evidence.”
That is not my contention. My argument goes as follows. We generally believe that suffering is “bad” — actually and definitionally –, from this principle we have derived certain rights, legal and moral. It isn’t the emotion that engenders the right, logically. It is our acceptance of the principle first. The right is conferred as a reaction. Hunt’s argument gets to this point — we held the principle, but we rejected the conclusion (for some groups) for a variety of reasons. However, this non-recognition doesn’t go to challenge the premises we accept that engender the right(s) held by others.
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“Hence I care not for the fluffy kitten any more that the slimy cockroach… if they threaten my survival, I’ll destroy them; If I need to eat them to live; I’ll kill ‘em and eat ‘em.”
Here is your selective reasoning again. Why doesn’t it follow from your own premises that the exploitation of human animals, under these same conditions, is both ethically and logically demanded? It would be maladapative if we as a species didn’t rid ourselves of the senile or otherwise handicapped.
It is because you are assuming a premise. This is Hunts contention about human rights and mine about animal rights. We collectively assume these premises, however, because we hold certain principles, the premise is harder and harder to defend — We know these rights exist, and these beings should be subject to them, even if we don’t acknowledge it yet.
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