The philosophy of animal rights premises that if a being is perceptually aware (i.e., sentient) then that being has interests that are important to him/her. One fundamental interest is in not suffering. The “harm principle,” indispensable in moral reasoning I think, asserts the impartial badness of suffering: regardless of the individual suffering, to be in pain, for example, is a bad thing; therefore, in our actions we ought to be considerate of harm and act accordingly. On this line of reasoning, then, sentience ought to be sufficient for membership in the moral community, regardless of species, because pain is pain, frustration is frustration, and suffering is suffering. Therefore reducing the amount of these bad things is intrinsically good.

In criticizing this argument, some imbue species membership with moral content and conclude that the pain experienced by a cow doesn’t count because she is not human. Human interests, then, always trump the cows. This logic, however, is debatable given that most would reject this reasoning out-of-hand in different contexts. The racist who argues that the interests of a black American does not count because he is not white would rightfully be criticized. So should the speciesist. Some, however, (still implying the reasonableness of speciesism) want to reject sentience as sufficient for moral personhood; instead relying on “moral agency,” the ability to link two concepts abstractly, or an understanding of hypothetical contracts, for example, moral personhood is more exclusive.

The latter argument follows from an insistence on human superiority. We claim that being capable of experiencing pain isn’t enough because it is too species-inclusive. Many species of animals (including humans) can suffer. Therefore, in regards to basic moral importance human animals are not unique or special. Paraphrasing Ingrid Newkirk, in regards to suffering, a mouse is a pig is a human. Our collective hubris, then, engenders this sophomoric claim to our special-ness: “We are better than chickens; we have to be!” We “other” all nonhuman animals because it is psychologically prudent to do so.

Unfortunately, however, our equally zealous refusal to acknowledge the inconsistency in grounding moral personhood on the ability to reciprocate moral obligations, while forgiving the inability to do so in all human babies and some mentally challenged human beings, a forgiveness that doesn’t extend to adult hogs who are certainly more rational and self-aware than these groups of humans, belies our claim to “superiority.” Demonstrable arbitrariness of this kind suggests not moral uniqueness making us worthy of consideration, but simply another base, egoistical animal.

The truth is we are evolutionarily unique. It is in (some of, not all) our capacity to recognize suffering qua suffering, as a subjective and evolutionary function, realize the badness of it, and use our reason to morally deliberate accordingly. We are special (on this arbitrary standard). It is in this distinctiveness that engenders our belief that we ought to consider the interests of the severely senile because these interests are important to them, regardless of their other mental deficiencies.

As an aside, a significant amount of research has suggested that concepts of justice are found in some nonhuman animal groups; empathy, kindness, and “community” certainly are. In 1871, Charles Darwin wrote,

“The difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind; “…there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher animals in mental faculties.” He added, “…they practice deceit and are revengeful,” and have “moral qualities,” the more important elements of which are “love and the distinct emotion of sympathy” (from, “Merle’s Door“).

Attributing these characteristics to nonhuman animals isn’t anthropomorphic. It is labeling an action X if it qualifies according to X’s definition as we conceive it.

Excluding the suffering, then, of a turkey because he is a turkey and not a human is contrary to what is (may be?) our rareness: the ability to act morally. It follows that ethical vegans don’t reject our status as “superior” (again, on some arbitrary standard), we illuminate it. It is a further attempt to realize our special faculties.

Crossposted @ That Vegan Girl

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Sections: Vegan Et Cetera, Vegan Theory
Topics: animal rights, ethics, philosophy, Theory, veg, Vegan