On The Issue Of “Unnecessary Suffering”
A participant in an ongoing debate surrounding the question “Should we eat meat?” asked: “What do you mean by “unnecessary suffering?” Who decides what is unnecessary?” The commenter apparently takes issue (or understands what we mean but insists on being obstinate) with the term “unnecessary.” I wonder, then, what do we mean by unnecessary?
Terms such as “needless,” “superfluous,” “excessive,” “uncalled for,” and “avoidable” are said to be appropriate synonyms according to my English thesaurus. But this isn’t really helpful when we are considering an issue - like ethics and nonhumans - so distorted by an all-pervasive prejudice.
For consider: we generally accept the premise that causing another to suffer is only acceptable if the action is necessitated by some general understanding of what constitutes “a need.” This would exclude, then, me harming you because it is more convenient than not doing so. You hurting me because you find it entertaining to do so would seem to violate this constraint. The racist, as another example, who causes a black American to suffer because the tradition in which he exists seemingly demands it would be considered unethical. Similarly, it would be wrong, on this premise, for a sexist to “punish” his girlfriend when she expresses an opinion because his father did the same to his mother.
Cutting to the core of this issue then, I think we could reasonably agree that “Because of convenience, entertainment, or tradition I do X to you” would be considered inappropriate given our belief that something as terrible as suffering is only acceptable within a system of strict ethical limits. (See Gary Francione for more.) Avoidability is assumed here too: It’s basic, ethically speaking, if I can complete action X without harming you, I ought to do so.
What about something as arbitrary as “I like how it tastes”? It seems to follow from our belief that pain is intrinsically evil that eating animals because their body parts taste good would violate this premise. We eat animals (and wear their skin and fur, for example) because it is convenient to do so, because most everybody else has done so and continues to do so (i.e., tradition), and because we have learned to enjoy how they taste. And further, we watch the torture of bulls during rodeos and spectator events in Pamplona, Spain because it entertains us. We even insist on forcing bunny rabbits to consume massive quantities of “botox” injections in an effort to find out if it’s safe for humans to use when trying to even out the wrinkles under their eyes because it’s what we have always done. (Actually, these torturous experiments - LD 50 - are attempting to find out how much of something it takes for a bunny rabbit to commit suicide by overdoes.)
Ask yourself: Do you believe that we can do anything and everything to animals? Or are their some constraints that we all kind of accept? Consider Michael Vick-esk treatment, or those images of worker’s pulling “downer” cows with a forklift. Is it possible that we simply haven’t asked ourselves those uncomfortable, but perfectly logical questions, such as: Vick tortured dogs because it entertained him to do so, and we chastised him for it. But what’s the difference between that wholly unnecessary example of suffering and us torturing and killing a cow just because we have been conditioned to enjoy how he tastes? (Again, see Francione.)
The term unnecessary at least implies “avoidable.” As such, and I think it’s unreasonable to argue otherwise, in this situation with killing the cow, as there are perfectly viable alternatives that many, many individuals have been re-conditioned to enjoy - including “faux cow” options - doesn’t our insistence on killing the cow violate our own beliefs about ethics?
Taste, convenience, entertainment, tradition: Is it not intuitive that these impetuses do not provide a good justification for forcing another to suffer? When applied to human suffering, I doubt that I would receive an argument from anyone. Therefore, this raises the question: Why do we accept these justifications - and therefore okay wholly unnecessary suffering - when we are considering animal pain, frustration, harm, terror, or any other form that suffering may take? As Francione argues, if we allow these exceptions, doesn’t the ”exception swallow the rule”?
It’s clearly a prejudice that mirrors racism and sexism in form: The interests, even at their most fundamental level (e.g., not to be in pain), of X group of individuals doesn’t count ethically because those in group Y have arbitrarily decided to make membership in their own group morally relevant and because the Y’s have the power to enforce this discrimination. Might, in this case, make’s right, as it did in Nazi Germany and pre- (and post-) Civil War America.
Isn’t it obvious, however, that we simply haven’t unfolded the logic of our own positions about suffering yet? We know what constitutes “unnecessary suffering” in virtually every other case except in our relationship with nonhumans. And yet, it is precisely this relationship that represents the largest portion of utterly unnecessary suffering being experienced in the world today. Why doesn’t this at least deserve a mention? And why am I “extreme” for broaching the question?
Going further: Doesn’t our acceptance of needless suffering on such a massive scale (e.g., 10 billion animals annually in the U.S. alone for food) undercut our own belief that it’s almost an ethical absolute that forcing another to suffer is something that should be avoided to the greatest extent possible? This raises another all-important question: What kind of society would we exist in if suffering could be forced on another so needlessly, in such a shockingly cavalier manner? Prejudices such as bigotry have been thoroughly discounted as valid ethical principles, as should our collective speciesism that say’s a horses pain doesn’t matter if it conflicts with my desire to force him to jump over something. It isn’t a good reason and we know it; given our rather muddied ethical history, we need to know it.
So let’s dispense with “What’s unnecessary?” shall we. You know; I know; we all know.
Crossposted @ That Vegan Girl
Some excellent points - It seems “whatever” the cruelty is - there is always the “justification” of “need”.
“Let us just call things as they are. When a man’s love of finery clouds his moral judgment, that is vanity. When he lets a demanding palate make his moral choices, that is gluttony. When he ascribes the divine will to his own whims, that is pride. And when he gets angry at being reminded of animal suffering that his own daily choices might help avoid, that is moral cowardice”. Dominion by M Scully p 121