Nozick’s Hypothetical:
On the assumption that one can only eat non-animals and be as healthy and happy as those who eat animals, an assumption supported by evidence and common sense, political philosopher Robert Nozick offers this hypothetical:
Suppose that I enjoy swinging a baseball bat. It happens that in front of the only place to swing it stands a cow. Swinging the bat unfortunately would involve smashing the cow’s head. But I wouldn’t get fun from doing that; the pleasure comes from exercising my muscles, swinging well, and so on. It’s unfortunate that as a side effect (not a means) of my doing this, the animal’s skull gets smashed. To be sure, I could forgo swinging the bat, and instead bend down and touch my toes or do some other exercise. But this wouldn’t be as enjoyable as swinging the bat; I won’t get as much fun, pleasure, or delight out of it.
So the question is: would it be all right for me to swing the bat in order to get the extra pleasure of swinging it as compared to the best available alternative activity that does not involve harming the animal? Suppose that it is not merely a question of foregoing today’s special pleasure of bat swinging; suppose that each day the same situation arises with a different animal. Is there some principle that would allow killing and eating animals for the additional pleasure this brings, yet would not allow swinging the bat for the extra pleasure that this brings? What could that principle be like?
Bernard E. Rollin writes, “Plato said, when dealing with adults and ethics, one cannot teach ethics, one can only remind, i.e., help people realize the unnoticed implications of their own beliefs.” Therefore, Nozick asks, if you “fail to devise a principle to distinguish swinging the bat from killing and eating an animal, you might decide it’s really all right, after all, to swing the bat.”
I ask, then, does this hold with your intuitions and moral assumptions? Do you want to be that person?
Crossposted @ That Vegan Girl
Since we don’t all play baseball or enjoy swinging bats, here are some variations on the above hypothetical:
- Suppose you enjoy taking roadtrips. You can take one of two paths to reach your destination. One is more enjoyable to drive, but it also crosses a migration path for turtles and butterflies. If you choose that path, you will most certainly kill some turtles and some butterflies (along with some small insects). If you choose the other path, it’s very unlikely you’ll kill anything larger than a small insect. Which path should you choose?
- Say you like surfing the web. There are millions of websites to visit. You like going to one site, say MySpace but then you learn that some sick sadist kills one kitten every time you visit MySpace. There are other websites that have similar things on them, like Facebook. Would it make sense to keep using MySpace and thus causing kitten death or should you start using Facebook instead?
I think the principle that Nozick is trying to get at here is related to direct causes of harm and indirect causes of harm. And I think there’s something to be said about our lessened ethical obligation to harm that has been caused indirectly by our actions, for example, the sick, kitten-killing sadist is an intervening cause and not truly related to web browsing or the web browser’s decisions. However, if the person has knowledge of the sadist and has the capacity to change browsing behavior then he or she is more culpable for the kittens’ deaths.
I think, however, as you are suggesting Elaine, that if one has knowledge that their action will instigate the harm (as in the case of the kittens’ deaths), the action moves from pure “indirect” to some middle-ground - not quite “direct,” by definition, but something else beyond indirect. This is reflected in our criminal negligence laws, for example, and others.
Nozick articulates another hypothetical about a seemingly inconsequential action that indirectly kills millions of cows; from this he asks the question, “ought we be constrained from doing said action?”, and suggests a premise that affirms an ethical constraint.
~ Recent blog post: "Empty Cages" at http://www.not-quiteright.net/tvg ~
I suspect I am wading in too deep here, having read this post and these comments only once. It seems, though, that there are some differences between these hypotheses and the act of eating meat.
1. Eating is necessary for life. Choosing to eat meat is not. Swinging bats and browsing the web are not necessary for life.
2. If you eat meat you necessitate the death of an animal. You may not kill the animal but you absolutely require that it die. If you swing bats or drive down roads the death of animals is secondary and not necessary for your enjoyment of these activities.
Wouldn’t it make more sense to develop a hypothesis that is more closely related to the act of eating meat? Or am I just off in some philosophical wasteland of my own, looking at my toes?
Nozick develops another hypothesis where the bones of nonhumans are necessary to make the most effective or productive baseball bats; another substance could be used, however, the bat would not be as efficient, therefore, the satisfaction gained would be greatly reduced.
Nozick asks, then, is there a principle that would justify killing the nonhumans to gain access to their bones - the satisfaction is not gained from the act of killing (as an end), but from the benefits derived from the killing (as a means)? Nozick argues that this situation parallels the case of killing a nonhuman because of the enjoyment we get from consuming his/her flesh.
Convenient,
No, you’re on target. It’s an analogy and all analogies are flawed because similar things are only similar, not the same.
This analogy speaks to the people who believe their taste buds are more important than animal lives. It’s for the ones who say, “But I like the taste of steak/salmon/fried chicken.” Those people, if they are ethically consistent, would likely swing the cow-killing bat, drive the turtle-killing route, and browse the kitten-killing web.