“An Interest Prior To Conception?” - Redux
Are we vegan because we’re attempting to avoid harming a nonhuman animal that does not yet exist? Do we boycott those industries that unjustly exploit nonhumans not necessarily for the sake of those already suffering but because we hope to prevent the suffering of those nonhumans that will be brought into existence to be likewise tortured and treated as mere objects?
It’s often argued that humans actually benefit nonhumans by human actions because they otherwise would not have existed absent our intervention: Humans give them a chance to live however short and miserable that life may be. We vegans respond by showing how this doesn’t follow as a matter of logic because one cannot benefit (or harm) something or someone that doesn’t exist. As I wrote in a previous post,
This is illogical on its face: the argument attributes interests or desires to a being that does not yet exist.
The illogical assumptions are these:
- The chicken who was slaughtered to provide me with his flesh desired to be born prior to his actual conception - the chicken had an interest in being alive during his pre-life existence.
- The life force that eventually became the pig had an interest in our intervention in the affairs of the mother and father pigs because this intervention resulted in the conception of the baby pig that was formerly the life force with the initial interest.
Sounds stupid right?
I’m not so sure anymore. If those who believe that suffering is intrinsically evil and ought to be limited to the greatest extent possible go vegan to prevent the torture and exploitation of future generations of nonhumans, the inverse must also be true: We can benefit a nonexistent being.
Doesn’t it follow as a matter of logic that we ought to bring nonhumans into existence if they are going to lead a good life?
Practically of course this doesn’t hold if we’re to accord equal consideration to the interests of all sentient beings as it would imply that we should intervene in the affairs of nonhumans whereby we force the conception of other nonhumans. This would undermine our argument that animals are not things: Individual nonhumans exist as separate entities, like human animals do; therefore, violating their bodily integrity harms an interest that ought to be protected - they have lives of their own. This practical difficulty enters the realm of moral harm.
This argument also suggests, as Peter Singer noted in Animal Liberation, that we ought to bring as many humans into existence as possible (on the presupposition that they will lead a good life). This is flawed as well, although not for the same reason as in the case of nonhumans, assuming that we don’t force procreation. Given certain limitations (finite resources, for example), it’s implausible that we could bring a limitless number of humans into existence while securing a good life for everyone involved.
I’m sure there are other practical and moral issues involved; however, as a matter of logic, it might be true that we can benefit a nonexistent being. This is all very random I know. It’s a non-issue for our purposes given that those who would appeal to this as a justification for breeding and raising animals as property are being internally contradictory:
Treating a person as property is a fundamental moral harm that cannot be justified by this argument because it violates the presupposition that for a nonexistent being to be benefited he/she must be secure in a good life when brought into this world. Me being your property does not a good life make! Therefore it fails tremendously as a sound reason for what we do to billions of nonhumans annually.
However, Jen and I have spoken about this recently. I also had a conversation to this effect with a friend of mine, and I think it’s interesting. Thoughts?
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Crossposted @ That Vegan Girl
I think the problem is larger. The problem is with the theory of Utilitarianism, not just with welfarism versus rights. That is, Singer is wrong because he’s a Utilitarian, not because he’s pro-happy meat.
In my opinion, Utilitarianism is a seriously flawed philosophy because it’s so acutely anti human nature. We humans form relationships and create strong preferences for individuals. We humans perceive ourselves as individuals, not merely due to modern philosophy of rights, but because of how our brains work and differentiate ourselves from the rest of the world. Utilitarianism doesn’t adequately account for this and creates a system that expects me to accord the same worth to my husband as to my accountant as to a stranger… While it’s not difficult for me to accord the same basic rights to all three people, I simply can’t adopt a philosophy that thinks harm to my husband is exactly the same as harm to a stranger. And I certainly can’t adopt a philosophy that asserts that harm to my husband is acceptable if it creates good for two other people. It’s anti-human because it’s anti-love, anti-emotion, anti-relationships, and even anti-society…
But that’s just my two cents
Singer does assume that humans have more interests to be counted because of our capacity to understand “ourselves as existing over time,” which leads him to conclude that death for a human is worse than death for a nonhuman. Nonhumans are “replaceable.” It follows, then, that a new being ought to be created if they are to live an equally happy life - the utilitarian calculation isn’t upset by replacing one with the other whereas this cannot occur with humans.
I believe that Singer is being a thoroughgoing speciesist when he argues that nonhumans are “replaceable” while humans aren’t, even if he phrases it as “humans have more interests” therefore they have an additional vote, if you will. (Regan is as well, as he makes a similar argument.) How he claims to believe that nonhumans are sentient, which is a means to an end, that end being life, which implies that they do have an interest in continued life, while at the same time claiming that they don’t have an interest in their future life baffles me. Indeed, all sentient beings individually experience their life therefore they are not “replaceable” - they are separate entities, with a distinct existance.
I agree with your criticism as well, Elaine. It’s an interesting argument, although I think Singer would (I would too) question what you seem to be implying here: a unified conception of human nature. However, utilitarian’s assume that humans are by nature hedonists, therefore, pain and pleasure and their relative intrinsic worth can be generalized to all sentient beings. I would question this assumption as well although I believe they are on better ground assuming these basic instincts.
However, all this said, do you agree that this is why we are vegan? Be it non-harm, less suffering, or non-violation of interests (basic rights), are we attempting to prevent these things from occurring to future generations? If yes, then the inverse must also be true: we can benefit a nonexistent being. This is interesting, theoretically, because it’s something I never thought.
~ Recent blog post: "An interest prior to conception?" - Redux at http://www.not-quiteright.net/tvg ~
Alex asked, “do you agree that this is why we are vegan? Be it non-harm, less suffering, or non-violation of interests (basic rights), are we attempting to prevent these things from occurring to future generations? If yes, then the inverse must also be true: we can benefit a nonexistent being.”
In a sense I agree. However, I wouldn’t agree that abstaining from harming someone is actually “a benefit” to them. Moreover, I think the benefits of veganism for future beings are side-benefits and not the core issue. For example, veganism is better for the environment and for human health than non-veganism, but the core issue of veganism is animal rights. The environmental issues and health issues are side-benefits and shouldn’t be central in vegan theory.
I am a vegan for present and future animals in the same way as I am an environmentalist for present and future humans: I want to protect what and who exists now, but also refrain from causing harm that will hurt or burden future generations.
When I go out on a hiking trail and I refrain from littering, destroying plants, digging holes, and other destructive behavior, I’m acting respectfully to the plants and animals that exist now along the hiking trail, but I’m also acting out of respect for future hikers. I know there will be future hikers along that path and even if I don’t know who they are I can and should refrain from destroying their future hiking experience. It’s not as much about interests prior to conception as it is about multiple reasons for behaving morally: the present and the future.
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Alex, you said, “I would [...] question what you seem to be implying here: a unified conception of human nature”
Well, I don’t want to say all humans are the same, they aren’t. But generally speaking, humans have emotions and humans form relationships with other humans (as well as with animals).
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This thought experiment might clarify part of what I think is wrong with Utilitarianism:
What if humans genetically engineered an animal who actually enjoyed torture and the feeling of death? Imagine a truly happy meat. Would it be moral to breed, torture, and kill that animal for food or any other reason (fashion, science, fun)?
The Utilitarian answer would probably* be “Yes, of course that would be moral. It would increase the feeling of pleasure in the world and decrease the feeling of pain.”
(*However, the Utilitarian might be against such an idea of creating a torture-loving slave species for other reasons: because of the harmful effects it might have on humans. Torturing others, even if they enjoy it, probably isn’t very good for the torturer. And consuming meat, even truly happy meat, isn’t good for humans because it’s so unhealthy. And a slave species who enjoys torture is still bad for the environment.)
The rightist’s/abolitionist’s response would be, “No, that’s not moral. Creating a torture-loving slave species is inherently immoral. It doesn’t matter if they enjoy torture or not, what matters is our complete control over their lives. Asserting complete domination over other sentient beings is immoral, period.” In the rightist’s mind, it’s wrong to own another sentient being. The issue is slavery, not pain.